Recent corporate legal and ethical meltdowns suggest that avoiding such harms to companies and to society requires a significant culture change within the organization. This paper addresses the issue of what it takes to change a corporate culture. While conventional wisdom may suggest that a change requires only the institution of an ethics office with proper reporting paths and an ethics code, such an approach is only a beginning. Many large corporations, especially those in danger of legal and ethical catastrophes, (...) need to undertake multiple initiatives to generate a new culture that manifests new values and new vocabularies. A cultural change accomplished by changing large numbers of personnel is expensive in financial and human terms. One component of a less costly approach is to tell new and different stories within the corporation because stories establish the cultural DNA that gives organizations, families, and individuals their identities. Such changes in individual firms, however, are influenced by the ideological assumptions within which and under which the industry and the society operates. (shrink)

In his illuminating discussion of ‘the Caspian question’ Sir William Tarn, basing his case mainly on Aristotle, Meteorologica, 2. 1. 10 and Strabo, 11. 7. 4, argued that Alexander knew of the existence of the Aral Sea. Tarn's conclusion, however, was soon challenged by Professor Lionel Pearson, who disagreed in particular with Tarn's interpretation of the passage in Strabo. But, although he undoubtedly succeeds in showing that some of Tarn's arguments are not valid, Pearson fails, as it seems to (...) me, to disprove his main contention. Indeed, Pearson misunderstands the line of Strabo's argument and is led to propose an unnecessary emendation of the text. (shrink)

This paper examines John Stuart Mill’s ‘psychological theory’ of the mind, as he set it out in his Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy. After outlining Mill’s theory and the problem he finds with it, the paper discusses four different interpretations that have been suggested, before proposing a new alternative reading. The matter is of intrinsic interest to anyone who sees value in trying to get to the bottom of tricky texts about puzzling questions by great philosophers, but (...) I argue also that the investigation may help us with another vexed interpretative issue relating to an even more famous philosopher, David Hume, and that it may hold lessons for the philosophy of mind today. (shrink)

Recent business headlines, particularly those related to the collapsed energy-trading giant, Enron and its auditor, Arthur Andersen raise concerns about accountants' ethical reasoning. We propose, and provide evidence from 90 new auditors from Big-Five accounting firms, that a selection-socialization effect exists in the accounting profession that results in hiring accountants with disproportionately higher levels of the Sensing/thinking (ST) cognitive style. This finding is important and relevant because we also find that the ST cognitive style is associated with relatively low levels (...) of ethical reasoning, regardless of gender. This finding implies a need for emphasis on the ethical training of accountants. The results also suggest that accounting firms should consider recruiting accountants with cognitive styles associated with relatively higher levels of ethical reasoning. (shrink)

What implications, if any, does evolutionary biology have for metaethics? Many believe that our evolutionary background supports a deflationary metaethics, providing a basis at least for debunking ethical realism. Some arguments for this conclusion appeal to claims about the etiology of the mental capacities we employ in ethical judgment, while others appeal to the etiology of the content of our moral beliefs. In both cases the debunkers’ claim is that the causal roles played by evolutionary factors raise deep epistemic problems (...) for realism: if ethical truths are objective or independent of our evaluative attitudes, as realists maintain, then we lose our justification for our ethical beliefs once we become aware of the evolutionary shaping of our ethical capacities or beliefs, which would not have disposed us reliably to track independent ethical truths; realism, they claim, thus saddles us with ethical skepticism. I distinguish and spell out various evolutionary debunking arguments along these lines and argue that they all fail: the capacity etiology argument fails to raise any special or serious problem for realism, and the content etiology arguments all rely on strong explanatory claims about our moral beliefs that are simply not supported by the science unless it is supplemented by philosophical claims that just beg the question against realism from the start. While the various debunking arguments do bring out some interesting commitments of ethical realism, and even raise some good challenges as realists develop positive moral epistemologies, they fall far short of their debunking ambitions. (shrink)

Books reviewed:Victor H. Matthews, Bernard M. Levinson and Tikva Frymer‐Kensky, Gender and Law in the Hebrew Bible and the Ancient Near EastNeil Asher Silberman and David B. Small, The Archaeology of Israel: Constructing the Past, Interpreting the PresentErich S. Gruen, Heritage and Hellenism: The Reinvention of Jewish TraditionBrenda Deen Schildgen, Power and Prejudice: The Reception of the Gospel of MarkDavid C. Sim, The Gospel of Matthew and Christian Judaism: The History and Social Setting of the Matthean CommunityAllan D. Fitzgerald, Augustine (...) Through the Ages: An EncyclopediaLionel R. Wickham, Hilary of Poitiers: Conflicts of Conscience and Law in the Fourth‐Century ChurchAidan Nichols, The Word Has Been Abroad: A Guide Through Balthasar's AestheticsAidan Nichols, No Bloodless Myth: A Guide Through Balthasar's DramaticsPaul Avis, God and the Creative Imagination: Metaphor, Symbol and Myth in Religion and TheologyGarrett Green, Imagining God: Theology and the Religious ImaginationL. William Countryman, The Poetic Imagination: An Anglican Spiritual TraditionRaphael Gallagher and Seán Cannon, Seán O'Riordan, A Theologian of Development: Selected EssaysJames Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong: Original Sin Through Easter EyesPeter Byrne, The Moral Interpretation of ReligionBrian Davies, Philosophy of Religion: A Guide to the SubjectGrace M. Jantzen, Becoming Divine: Towards a Feminist Philosophy of ReligionKeith E. Yandell, Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary IntroductionLouis Dupré, Religious Mystery and Rational Reflection: Excursions in the Phenomenology and Philosophy of ReligionMichael E. Allsopp, Ethics and the Catechism of the Catholic ChurchCharles E. Curran, The Catholic Moral Tradition Today: A SynthesisBernard Hoose, Christian Ethics: An IntroductionPaul Goodliff, Care in a Confused Climate: Pastoral Care and Postmodern CultureSouzy Dracopoulou, Ethics and Values in Health Care ManagementMichael Parker, Ethics and Community in the Health Care ProfessionsHans Küng and Walter Jens, A Dignified Dying: A Plea for Personal ResponsibilityRobin Gill, Euthanasia and the ChurchesGerald Dworkin, R. G. Frey and Sissela Bok, Euthanasia and Physician‐Assisted SuicideCaroline Dunn, Ethical Issues in Mental IllnessDavid Smith, Life and Morality: Contemporary Medico‐Moral IssuesGilbert C. Meilaender, Body, Soul and BioethicsDavid E. Cooper and Joy A. Palmer, Spirit of the EnvironmentJ. Milburn Thompson, Justice and Peace: A Christian PrimerMaura M. Ryan and Todd David Whitmore, The Challenge of Global Stewardship: Roman Catholic ResponsesCelia Deane‐Drummond, Theology and Biotechnology: Implications for a New ScienceJohn O'Neill, The Market: Ethics, Knowledge and PoliticsErika Rummel, The Humanist–Scholastic Debate in the Renaissance and the ReformationInger Ekrem, Minna Skafte Jensen and Egil Kraggerud, Reformation and Latin Literature in Northern EuropeM. C. Questier, Newsletters from the Archpresbyterate of George BirkheadJeffrey von Arx, Varieties of UltramontanismFrank J. Coppa, Controversial Concordats: The Vatican's Relations with Napoleon, Mussolini and HitlerA. J. Hoover, God, Britain and Hitler in World War II: The View of the British Clergy, 1939–;1945Pierre Blet, Pius XII and the Second World War according to the Archives of the VaticanPeter Harrison, The Bible, Protestantism and the Rise of Natural ScienceMichael P. Hornsby‐Smith, Catholics in England, 1950–2000: Historical and Sociological PerspectivesCarol K. Coburn and Martha Smith, Spirited Lives: How Nuns Shaped Catholic Culture and American Life, 1836–1920Robert E. Burns, Being Catholic, Being American: The Notre Dame Story, 1842–1934Paul C. Gutjahr, An American Bible: A History of the Good Book in the United States, 1777–1880Harriet A. Harris, Fundamentalism and EvangelicalsJeffrey Richards, Scott Wilson and Linda Woodhead,Diana: The Making of a Media Saint. (shrink)

This paper describes a one-day workshop format for introducing ethics into the engineering curriculum prepared at the University of Puerto Rico at Mayagüez (UPRM). It responds to the ethics criteria newly integrated into the accreditation process by the Accreditation Board of Engineering and Technology (ABET). It also employs an ethics across the curriculum (EAC) approach; engineers identify the ethical issues, write cases that dramatize these issues, and then develop exercises making use of these cases that are specially tailored to mainstream (...) engineering classes. The different activities and strategies employed in this workshop are set forth. Specific references are made to the cases and exercises developed as a result of these workshops. The paper ends by summarizing the different assessments made of the workshop by addressing the following questions: how did it contribute to the overall ABET effort at UPRM; could other universities benefit from a similar activity; and how did the participants evaluate the workshop? (shrink)

In this reply to James H. Fetzer’s “Minds and Machines: Limits to Simulations of Thought and Action”, I argue that computationalism should not be the view that (human) cognition is computation, but that it should be the view that cognition (simpliciter) is computable. It follows that computationalism can be true even if (human) cognition is not the result of computations in the brain. I also argue that, if semiotic systems are systems that interpret signs, then both humans and computers are (...) semiotic systems. Finally, I suggest that minds can be considered as virtual machines implemented in certain semiotic systems, primarily the brain, but also AI computers. In doing so, I take issue with Fetzer’s arguments to the contrary. (shrink)

The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) is an influential non-consequentialist principle positing a role for intention in affecting the moral permissibility of some actions. In particular, the DDE focuses on the intend/foresee distinction, the core claim being that it is sometimes permissible to bring about as a foreseen but unintended side-effect of one’s action some harm it would have been impermissible to aim at as a means or as an end, all else being equal. This article explores the meaning and (...) application of the DDE along with current debates over the nature of the intend/foresee distinction and its moral significance. How is the line between intended effects and merely foreseen but unintended side-effects to be drawn, and how are problem cases best handled? What is an appropriate methodology for debating the tenability of the DDE? How might the DDE interact with other non-consequentialist principles, and how might it be modified to capture other related factors (resulting perhaps in a Doctrine of Triple Effect) or to avoid certain problem cases? Does the DDE make permissibility turn on the actual intentions of particular agents, as critics such as Thomson and Scanlon assume, or is the role of intention more abstract? (shrink)

Philosophy has been characterized (e.g., by Benson Mates) as a field whose problems are unsolvable. This has often been taken to mean that there can be no progress in philosophy as there is in mathematics or science. The nature of problems and solutions is considered, and it is argued that solutions are always parts of theories, hence that acceptance of a solution requires commitment to a theory (as suggested by William Perry's scheme of cognitive development). Progress can be had (...) in philosophy in the same way as in mathematics and science by knowing what commitments are needed for solutions. Similar views of Rescher and Castañeda are discussed. (shrink)

First published in 1952, British Empirical Philosophers is a comprehensive picture of one of the most important movements in the history of philosophic thought. In his introduction, Professor A. J. Ayer distinguishes the main problems of empiricism and gives a critical account of the ways in which the philosophers whose writings are included in this volume attempted to solve them. Editors Ayer and Raymond Winch bring together an authoritative abridgement of John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding ; Bishop George Berkeley’s (...) Principles of Human Knowledge ; almost the entire first book of David Hume’s Treatise Concerning Human Nature ; and extracts from Thomas Reid’s Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man and John Stuart Mill’s Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy. (shrink)

His authority is always grounded in the very authority he deposes, with the result that his voice is little more than a theatrical performance that unwittingly re-enacts the rhetorical maneuvers of deposed father figures.

The ‘default mode’ network refers to cortical areas that are active in the absence of goal-directed activity. In previous studies, decreased activity in the ‘default mode’ has always been associated with increased activation in task-relevant areas. We show that the induction of hypnosis can reduce anterior default mode activity during rest without increasing activity in other cortical regions. We assessed brain activation patterns of high and low suggestible people while resting in the fMRI scanner and while engaged in visual tasks, (...) in and out of hypnosis. High suggestible participants in hypnosis showed decreased brain activity in the anterior parts of the default mode circuit. In low suggestible people, hypnotic induction produced no detectable changes in these regions, but instead deactivated areas involved in alertness. The findings indicate that hypnotic induction creates a distinctive and unique pattern of brain activation in highly suggestible subjects. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Del Mar offered two main criticisms of Marmor’s account of social conventions. The first took issue with Marmor’s claim that the constitutive rules of games and kindred social practices determine in an objective way their central aims and values; the second charged Marmor with scanting the historical context in which conventions do their important normative work in shaping the goals of games. I argue that Del Mar’s criticism of Marmor’s account of the normative (...) centrality and force of constitutive rules in games and the like fails, but that his criticism faulting Marmor for giving short shrift to the normative work conventions do in these social practices is on the mark. So while I reject Del Mar’s claim that a closer look at the social and historical contexts in which the conventions of games and the like carry out their normative tasks undermines Marmor’s account of constitutive rules, I think his argument that conventions play a far more important, even if supplementary, role in shaping our understanding of and participation in these social practices than Marmor allows is persuasive. (shrink)

Is sociology inherently a mode of secular materialism? Or, are there intellectual resources deep within the sociological tradition, expansively conceived, that offer the sociological imagination a spiritual `post-secular' perspective on society and culture? This article draws out the subterranean theological stream of sociological consciousness and illuminates a `sacramentalist' socio-theology with particular reference to the `iconic vision' of Paul Evdokimov. In the context of late modernity, such a radical emphasis on the sacred foundations and transcendent potentialities of life provides the possibility (...) of a fundamental critique of commodified profane culture and of sociology itself. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against the view of G.E.L. Owen that the second version of the Third Man Argument is a sound objection to Plato's conception of Forms as paradigms and that Plato knew it. The argument can be formulated so as to be valid, but Plato need not be committed to one of its premises. Forms are self-predicative, but the ground of self-predication is not the same as that of ordinary predication.

(1985). Chance, Skill, and Sport: A Critical Comment. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport: Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 62-63. doi: 10.1080/00948705.1985.9714429.

Everyone has a different "learning style". (A good introduction to the topic of learning styles is Claxton & Murrell 1987. For more on different learning styles, see Keirsey Temperament and Character Web Site, William Perry's Scheme of Intellectual and Ethical Development, Holland 1966, Kolb 1984, Sternberg 1999. For an interesting discussion of some limitations of learning styles from the perspective of teaching styles, see Glenn 2009/2010.) For some online tools targeted at different learning styles, see "100 Helpful Web Tools (...) for Every Kind of Learner". (shrink)

The doctrine of the spiritual senses has played a significant role in the history of Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox spirituality. What has been largely unremarked is that the doctrine also played a significant role in classical Protestant thought, and that analogous concepts can be found in Indian theism. In spite of the doctrine’s significance, however, the only analytic philosopher to consider it has been Nelson Pike. I will argue that his treatment is inadequate, show how the development of the (...) doctrine in Puritan thought and spirituality fills a serious lacuna in Pike’s treatment, and conclude with some suggestions as to where the discussion should go next. (shrink)

A systematic approach to the development of an applied scientific research program to meet a developing country's future technological needs is briefly described. The essential features common to all applied science programs are discussed, and approaches to the special problems of a developing country suggested.

In this article I argue that "Timaeus" 48e-52d, the passage in which Plato introduces the receptacle into his ontology, Contains the material for a satisfactory response to the third man argument. Plato's use of "this" and "such" to distinguish the receptacle, Becoming, And the forms clarifies the nature of his ontology and indicates that the forms are not, In general, self-predicative. This result removes one argument against regarding the "Timaeus" as a late dialogue.

ABSTRACT There is a fierce debate about nonsmokers-only hiring policies, also referred to as no-nicotine hiring policies and “tobacco free” hiring policies. The favorable outcomes of no-nicotine hiring policies include reduced health costs, improved worker productivity, enhanced organizational image, and symbolic messaging. The unfavorable consequences of such policies include violating personal liberty, risking a “slippery slope” to other health-compromising behaviors, exacerbating socio-economic disparities, and discriminating against smokers. No-nicotine hiring policies have not been adequately evaluated and a new approach is warranted. (...) The new conditional employment policy for smokers is described with stipulations for the probationary period. Autonomy and fairness are frequently cited as ethical principles to analyze no-nicotine hiring policies. An analysis of ethical principles is presented for no-nicotine hiring policies and the new conditional employment policy. The ethical principle of fairness is rooted in the effectiveness of any policy. Therefore, an evaluation plan is described for the conditional employment policy to assess effectiveness and efficiency. The proposed policy provides a powerful incentive to overcome smoking addictions, preserve the ethical principles of autonomy and fairness, as well as bridge the divide between personal liberty and personal responsibility. (shrink)

This essay is a rudimentary effort at the functional specialization of dialectic. Following Lonergan’s maxim in Insight to develop positions and to reverse counterpositions, it takes a relatively simple puzzle about eisegesis and criticises some basic confusions about what goes “into” the reading of texts. In the process two counterpositions on the meaning of “text” are criticised and an alternative to both defended.